Because Mckesson allegedly directed an unlawful obstruction of a highway, see La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §14:97 (West 2018), the Fifth Circuitheld that the First Amendment did not shield him from li-ability for the downstream consequences. 945 F. 3d, at 829. Again, the dissent disagreed, deeming the “novel ‘negligent protest’ theory of liability” to be “incompatible with theFirst Amendment and foreclosed—squarely—by” Claiborne Hardware. 945 F. 3d, at 842 (opinion of Willett, J.). The Fifth Circuit subsequently deadlocked 8 to 8 on Mckesson’s petition for rehearing en banc. 947 F. 3d 874, 875 (2020) (per curiam). Members of the Court of Appealswrote separately to express further disagreement with boththe panel decision’s interpretation of state law, id., at 879 (Higginson, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc),and its application of Claiborne Hardware, 947 F. 3d, at 878
(Dennis, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). The question presented for our review is whether the the-ory of personal liability adopted by the Fifth Circuit violatesthe First Amendment. When violence occurs during activ-ity protected by the First Amendment, that provision man-dates “precision of regulation” with respect to “the groundsthat may give rise to damages liability” as well as “the per-sons who may be held accountable for those damages.” Claiborne Hardware, 458 U. S., at 916–917 (internal quota-tion marks omitted). Mckesson contends that his role in leading the protest onto the highway, even if negligent and punishable as a misdemeanor, cannot make him personallyliable for the violent act of an individual whose only associ-ation with him was attendance at the protest.We think that the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of statelaw is too uncertain a premise on which to address the ques-tion presented. The constitutional issue, though undenia-bly important, is implicated only if Louisiana law permits recovery under these circumstances in the first place.
The dispute thus could be “greatly simplifie[d]” by guidance from the Louisiana Supreme Court on the meaning of Lou-isiana law. Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 151 (1976). Fortunately, the Rules of the Louisiana Supreme Court,like the rules of 47 other States, provide an opportunity to obtain such guidance. In the absence of “clear controllingprecedents in the decisions of the” Louisiana SupremeCourt, those Rules specify that the federal courts of appealsmay certify dispositive questions of Louisiana law on their own accord or on motion of a party. La. Sup. Ct. Rule 12, §§1–2 (2019). Certification is by no means “obligatory” merely because state law is unsettled; the choice instead rests “in the sound discretion of the federal court.” Lehman Brothers v. Schein, 416 U. S. 386, 391 (1974). Federal courts have only rarely resorted to state certification proce-dures, which can prolong the dispute and increase the ex-penses incurred by the parties. See id., at 394–395
(Rehnquist, J., concurring). Our system of “cooperative ju-dicial federalism” presumes federal and state courts alikeare competent to apply federal and state law. Id., at 391 (opinion of the Court); cf. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U. S. 455, 465 (1990).In exceptional instances, however, certification is advisa-ble before addressing a constitutional issue. See Bellotti, 428 U. S., at 151; Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U. S. 207, 212 (1960). Two aspects of this case, taken together, per-suade us that the Court of Appeals should have certified to the Louisiana Supreme Court the questions (1) whether Mckesson could have breached a duty of care in organizing and leading the protest and (2) whether Officer Doe has al-leged a particular risk within the scope of protection af-forded by the duty, provided one exists. See 945 F. 3d, at 839 (opinion of Willett, J.).First, the dispute presents novel issues of state law pecu-liarly calling for the exercise of judgment by the state courts. See Lehman Brothers, 416 U. S., at 391.
To imposea duty under Louisiana law, courts must consider “variousmoral, social, and economic factors,” among them “the fair-ness of imposing liability,” “the historical development ofprecedent,” and “the direction in which society and its insti-tutions are evolving.” Posecai, 752 So. 2d, at 766. “Specu-lation by a federal court about” how a state court would weigh, for instance, the moral value of protest against the economic consequences of withholding liability “is particu-larly gratuitous when the state courts stand willing to ad-dress questions of state law on certification.” Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U. S. 43, 79 (1997) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Second, certification would ensure that any conflict in this case between state law and the First Amendment is not purely hypothetical. The novelty of the claim at issue hereonly underscores that “[w]arnings against premature adju-
5 Cite as: 592 U. S. ____ (2020) Per Curiam dication of constitutional questions bear heightened atten-tion when a federal court is asked to invalidate a State’s law.” Ibid. The Louisiana Supreme Court, to be sure, may announce the same duty as the Fifth Circuit. But under the unusual circumstances we confront here, we conclude that the Fifth Circuit should not have ventured into so uncertain an area of tort law—one laden with value judgments and fraught with implications for First Amendment rights—without first seeking guidance on potentially controlling Louisiana law from the Louisiana Supreme Court. We ex-press no opinion on the propriety of the Fifth Circuit certi-fying or resolving on its own any other issues of state law that the parties may raise on remand. We therefore grant the petition for writ of certiorari, va-cate the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals forthe Fifth Circuit, and remand the case to that court for fur-ther proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. JUSTICE BARRETT took no part in the consideration ordecision of this case. JUSTICE THOMAS dissents.
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